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Imagine you or your wife, your sister, your mother, your aunt, or
your best friend, has just been diagnosed with breast cancer. Treat-
ment is expensive. What if you or your loved one does not have
medical insurance? Worse yet, what if you or your loved one has
medical insurance, but it does not cover the treatment you need to
survive?
What are you going to do? Can you pay for the treatment out of
pocket? What if it costs anywhere from $100,000-$300,000? If you
do not have that kind of money sitting in the bank, can you raise the
money? Will friends and family and the community donate their hard
earned dollars to save a life? In the case of Nelene Fox, her family and
community did just that.1
Unfortunately, the efforts of family and community were too late.
By the time Nelene raised enough money to afford the High Dose
Chemotherapy and Bone Marrow Transplant (HDC-ABMT) her
doctor recommended, the cancer had advanced and her body had
deteriorated to such a degree that the procedure could not help her.'
Nelene Fox had health insurance coverage through her employer, but
was denied coverage for the treatment by her health maintenance
organization, HealthNet, because HealthNet deemed the coverage to
be experimental.
What caused the death of Nelene Fox: the cancer or the inability
to get the treatment that she so desperately needed when she needed
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1. Insurance Bad Faith: $89 Million Verdict in Suit Alleging Bad Faith Denial of Coverage
for Bone Marrow Transplant, VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, Mar. 1994, at 84 (discussing
Fox v. HealthNet, No. 219/692, (Riverside Cty. Sup. Ct. Ca. Dec. 28, 1993)) [hereinafter
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2. Id.
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it? If a treatment can add a few-years to someone like Nelene Fox's
life, should an HMO be required to pay for the treatment? Does it
matter what an insurer should do in those circumstances, or is the only
relevant consideration what the insurer must do according to the terms
of the insurance policy? As the law stands, coverage decisions with
regard to experimental treatment provisions are left to the whim of the
insurer or the rushed decision of a trial court. No uniform method
exists on which insurers, policyholders, doctors, or courts can rely
when determining whether an experimental treatment should be
covered. As a result, coverage determinations are erratic and inconsis-
tent.
For example, with regard to HDC-ABMT, some courts have
ruled that HDC-ABMT is not experimental.3 Others have ruled the
treatment is experimental. ' Still others have declined to decide
whether the treatment is experimental and have determined coverage
based on other grounds.5 In light of the inconsistent judicial opinions,
some state legislatures have taken matters into their own hands.
Eleven states have passed legislation that requires health benefit
providers to offer or provide autologous bone marrow transplants for
breast cancer patients regardless of experimental or investigational
contract provisions.6 Unfortunately, the legislation currently written
is inconsistent and is not available to all breast cancer patients.
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer patients is not the only controver-
sial procedure to be classified as experimental or investigative. The
same concerns arise when dealing with any new or experimental
treatment. To illustrate the controversy surrounding experimental
treatment provisions in general, this Comment examines the case law
and resulting legislation pertaining to HDC-ABMT as a treatment for
breast cancer. Part I presents background information on autologous
bone marrow transplants generally, and how the treatment relates
specifically to breast cancer patients. Part II presents a survey of
current law regarding coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. Part
III explores the merits and limits of judicial and legislative determina-
tions of whether a particular treatment is covered under an insurance
3. See, e.g., Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md.
1991).
4. See, e.g., Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
5. See, e.g., Kekis v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp.
571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
6. California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia have promulgated such legislation. Illinois and
Maine are considering similar bills. See also infra notes 119-148 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 20:451
Insurance Coverage
policy. Part III then concludes that while judicial and legislative
intervention may be appropriate, these methods! fail to uniformly secure
treatment for breast cancer sufferers. Part IV presents alternatives to
existing judicial and legislative determinations. Specifically, this
Comment recommends more expansive legislation that addresses
experimental procedure exclusions generally and proposes a model
statute.
I. UNDERSTANDING HDC-ABMT AND BREAST CANCER
To understand the numerous variables that are considered when
determining whether a procedure is experimental, it is helpful to look
at background information about both the disease-breast cancer, and
the treatment-HDC-ABMT. Decisionmakers must take into
consideration factors such as how common the disease is, whether the
treatment is used to treat other diseases, and what kinds of success
rates accompany the procedure. Breast cancer is an appropriate
example because the disease is common and touches many peoples'
lives.7 If you think the disease will not affect your life or your loved
ones, the statistics prove you wrong. Each year the number of women
in the United States who are diagnosed with breast cancer exceeds
180,000.8 Breast cancer ranks as the most common form of cancer in
women, numbering 184,300 new invasive cases in 1996. Breast
cancer is the second leading cause of cancer death in women, with an
estimated 44,300 deaths in 1996.0
HDC-ABMT has emerged as a last resort treatment for breast
cancer patients. Despite the wide use of HDC-ABMT in the
treatment of other cancers such as leukemia or Hodgkin's disease,"
7. Breast cancer is cancer initiating in breast tissue. Generally, cancer occurs when cells
which make up the various organs of the body divide in an uncontrolled or disorderly manner.
Typically, cells divide and produce more cells only when they are needed. In a cancer patient,
cells divide when new cells are not needed and form an extra mass of tissue commonly called a
tumor. Only malignant tumors are cancerous.
Cancer cells may invade nearby tissues and organs or they may enter the bloodstream or
lymphatic system. This spread of cancer is called metastasis. When cancer spreads in this
manner and attacks other parts of the body, the disease carries the same name as the primary
cancer. For example, if a person was afflicted with breast cancer and the cancer cells spread, the
disease is referred to as metastatic breast cancer. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NIH PUB. No. 94-1556, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT BREAST CANCER 2-3 (1993).
8. Id. at 28.
9. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 12 (1996).
10. Id. at 11-12.
11. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1407.
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insurance coverage for HDC-ABMT treatment of breast cancer has
been erratic at best.
HDC-ABMT is a type of systemic treatment for cancer that
involves a two-part procedure.1 2 First, a physician extracts from the
patient her own bone marrow cells which are then frozen. 3 Next, the
patient undergoes high-dose chemotherapy in an attempt to kill the
cancer cells." The dose of chemotherapy is near lethal, and may be
one thousand times more potent than that of standard chemother-
apy.15 The patient's remaining bone marrow is destroyed in the
chemotherapy process. Once chemotherapy is completed, the patient's
own, "autologous," frozen marrow is reinfused intravenously into the
patient's bloodstream." After the chemotherapy and transplant, the
patient's immune system is essentially nonfunctional until the bone
marrow begins producing new blood cells. Because of susceptibility to
viral infections, great care, including extensive hospitalization, must be
taken to prevent the patient from becoming infected. 7 The cost of
this procedure carries an expensive price tag, ranging from $100,000-
$300,000.8
The HDC-ABMT procedure has been criticized for having an
"excessive" mortality rate.19 The high dose chemotherapy used to kill
cancerous cells, coupled with the bone marrow transplantation, imposes
serious trauma on the body. However, current studies indicate higher
response and survival rates from HDC-ABMT treatment as compared
12. Many treatment options are available to breast cancer patients. The method of
treatment varies according to the size and location of the tumor, various test results, and the stage
of the disease. However, there are two basic methods of treatment, local or systemic. Local
treatments remove or destroy the cancer cells in a specific area and include surgery and radiation
therapy. Systemic treatments, which destroy or control cancer cells all over the body, are used
when the cancer has metastasized. Chemotherapy and hormone therapy are two kinds of systemic
treatments. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 12-13.
13. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1407.
14. Id.
15. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990).
16. Id. Replacement marrow may also be donated by another person. This treatment is
called allogenic bone marrow transplantation. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at
33.
17. Jennifer L. Hardester, In Furtherance of an Equitable, Consistent Structure for Reviewing
Experimental Coverage Decisions: the Lessons of Pitman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma,
14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 294 (1994).
18. Id. See also Nessium v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 805 (8th Cir. 1993)
(procedure cost $160,000); Kekis, 815 F. Supp. at 575 (procedure cost $150,000); White v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1420 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991)
(procedure cost $195,000); Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 588 (procedure cost $100,000); Insurance Bad
Faith, supra note 1, at 84 (procedure cost $212,000).
19. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1411.
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to patients treated with standard chemotherapy.2" HDC-ABMT also
causes tumor shrinkage, which in turn leads to an increased survival
rate.2 ' Despite research which indicates that HDC-ABMT results in
higher response, survival, and tumor shrinkage rates when compared
to standard chemotherapy, HDC-ABMT still has a low survival rate
overall. Depending on the data analyzed, the survival rates of persons
undergoing bone marrow transplants range from five to twenty
percent.22
Because of the low survival rates and the high cost of the
procedure, insurance companies are hesitant to pay for HDC-ABMT
and physicians do not recommend the procedure unless it is the
patient's last hope. Therefore, the recommendation and coverage of
this treatment has led to extensive litigation.
II. SURVEY OF CURRENT LAW
A. Case Law
The case law surrounding HDC-ABMT reflects the controversial
nature of its subject matter. Decisions show that the courts cannot
make consistent individual determinations, let alone broad policy
statements. The cases described below demonstrate that the courts are
an inappropriate forum for coverage determinations regarding
experimental treatment provisions.
Judicial interpretation of experimental treatment provisions have
been inconsistent. The 3rd, 5th, and 7th Circuits have ruled that
HDC-ABMT as a treatment for breast cancer is experimental and not
covered. 23 In contrast, the 8th Circuit characterized HDC-ABMT as
experimental only with regard to treating some forms of cancers such
as melanomas, but not with regard to treating advanced cancer.24
Other courts have not addressed the issue of whether the treatment is
experimental, but have ruled in favor of requiring insurance companies
20. See infra notes 169-183 and accompanying text.
21. Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 592. See also Paul Earl Pongrace, III, Comment,
HDC/ABMT: Experimental Treatment or Cure All? (Ask the insurance companies), 2 J.
PHARMACY & L. 329, 333 (1994).
22. Hardester, supra note 17, at 294.
23. See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Clark v. K-
Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1992); Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1992). See also Robin E. Margolis, In the Courts: Autologous Bone Marrow Transplants,
HEALTHSPAN, Jan. 1994, at 1 [hereinafter In the Courts]; Robin E. Margolis, Insurance: Tide
Turning Against ABMT in Federal Appellate Courts, HEALTHSPAN, Jun. 1993, at 21, 22
[hereinafter Insurance].
24. Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992).
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to pay for the treatment on other grounds.2" Finally, the 4th Circuit
skirted the experimental treatment issue by upholding the insurer's
decision to deny coverage based on the express policy language.26
The inconsistent body of precedent allows courts to ignore the
issue of the character of the treatment and either deny or provide
coverage by relying on contract principles and the language of the
insurance policies. The inconsistency also allows courts to order or
deny coverage based on expert testimony regarding the utility and
efficacy of the treatment. As the case law stands, medical decisions
that should be decided on a doctor-patient level, as well as insurance
decisions that should be decided on a insurer-insured level, are being
decided on a judicial level. Unfortunately, at the judicial level the
decisionmaker is least interested in the outcome, and least knowledge-
able about the medical consequences.
1. Determining Whether Treatment is Experimental or Not
Some courts have defined HDC-ABMT as nonexperimental. In
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan,27 the court found that
HDC-ABMT did not fall under the provision excluding services that
are experimental or investigational.28  In Jenkins, the claimant's
insurance policy included two "riders"-the Rider BMT and the Rider
GLE-1.29 The Rider BMT provided that HDC-ABMT would only
be covered when performed to treat specified diseases, of which breast
cancer was not listed.30 The court found that this language was clear
and that the procedure was not covered under this provision. 31
However, the court went on to assess whether the Rider BMT
excluded coverage for high dose chemotherapy where chemotherapy is
a covered treatment for breast cancer under the plan. Under those
circumstances, the court held that the insurer could deny coverage for
bone marrow transplants but not for high dose chemotherapy.32 The
court further adopted the reasoning of the court in Doe v. Group
25. See Insurance, supra note 23, at 22.
26. See, e.g., Caudill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, Inc., 999 F.2d 74
(4th Cir. 1993).
27. No. 8:93 CV 7295, 1994 WL 901184 (N.D. Ohio May 9, 1994).
28. Id. at *8.
29. Id. at 01. The Rider BMT sought to exclude autologous bone marrow transplants for
breast cancer patients. The Rider GLE-1 excludes services that are "experimental" or
"investigative."
30. Id. at 05.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Id. at *6-8.
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Hospitalization & Medical Services,33 that the actual treatment for
breast cancer is the high dose chemotherapy and that the bone marrow
transplant is only necessary to avoid the disastrous side effects of the
chemotherapy.34
Finally, the court analyzed whether, despite coverage of standard
chemotherapy, Rider GLE-1 excluded coverage for HDC because it
was experimental. The court found the treatment was not experimen-
tal and therefore not excluded from coverage."5 The court relied
heavily upon the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Bolwell. 6
Dr. Bolwell testified that HDC-ABMT is "accepted as standard
therapy for treatment of many malignancies. This procedure is not
'experimental' in the treatment of patients such as [plaintiff] with
inflammatory carcinoma of the breast. '3'  Dr. Bolwell also testified
that although the treatment was administered pursuant to a study, that
did not support the treatment as experimental.3" Further, Dr. Bolwell
testified that the procedure was being performed in "virtually every
major cancer center in this country. .. . 'Leading oncologists through-
out the country recognize the importance of continued treatment for
selected patients with breast cancer using [ABMT]."' 39  The court
ultimately concluded with very strong language that "[r]easonable
minds could only conclude that HDC [for breast cancer] is neither
experimental nor investigational."4  "Clearly, HDC in conjunction
with ABMT is now accepted nationwide as a treatment for breast
cancer."41
33. 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993).
34. Jenkins, 1994 \VL 901184, at 07-8. The court explained,
To allow Blue Cross to rely on Rider BMT to avoid payment for high dose chemothera-
py when it is undisputed that chemotherapy is covered elsewhere in the Policy would
be, as the Wilson court held, to let the tail wag the dog. It is the high dose chemother-
apy that kills the cancer cells; the bone marrow transplant merely protects the patient's
bone marrow.
Id. at e8. See also Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. and Med. Serv., 893 P.2d 1323 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994) (upholding decision to provide coverage where policy expressly provided coverage for
bone marrow transplants and chemotherapy procedures; finding that read together these provisions
supported the trial court determination that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer was covered under
the policy).
35. Jenkins, 1994 WL 901184, at '11.
36. Id. at 010. Brian Bolwell, M.D. specializes in HDC-ABMT and is the Director of the
Bone Marrow Transplant Program at Cleveland Clinic. Id
37. Id. at 010 (citing Bonwell affidavit at para. 17).
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at *11 (citing Bonwell affidavit at para. 19).
40. Id. at *12.
41. Id. See also Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that in light of medical testimony indicating HDC-ABMT is an effective
19971
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Similarly, in Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc.,4 2
the court ruled that HDC-ABMT treatment for breast cancer was not
experimental and that the procedure was generally acknowledged as
accepted medical practice.43 The plaintiffs in Adams sought pre-
authorization for HDC-ABMT as the best available care for their
breast cancer." Blue Cross/Blue Shield denied coverage, acknowledg-
ing that HDC-ABMT was covered for other diseases such as
Hodgkin's Lymphoma, acute leukemia and testicular cancer, but
claiming the treatment was experimental when used to treat breast
cancer.45 The claimant's insurance policy in Adams defined the term
"experimental or investigative" to mean "any treatment ... not
generally acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suitable
medical specialty practicing in Maryland."46
The court found that at the time Blue Cross/Blue Shield denied
coverage, Maryland oncologists generally acknowledged HDC-ABMT
as accepted medical practice.47 The testimony revealed that oncolo-
gists regularly refer breast cancer patients to institutions which
administer HDC-ABMT.4s  Moreover, experts testified that the
treatment was being offered at major medical centers nationwide. The
court found this evidence to be persuasive that the treatment was
generally accepted medical practice; and, therefore, did not fall under
the definition of "experimental" as set out in the insurance policy.4 9
treatment for breast cancer and that breast cancer patients who are treated with HDC-ABMT
have a better prognoses than those who receive only conventional treatment, the treatment is not
experimental or research in nature).
42. 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991).
43. Id. at 669. This case is a consolidation of two cases, one brought by Mrs. Adams and
one by Mrs. Whittington. Mrs. Adams was a thirty-four-year-old mother of two. She was
diagnosed in 1990 with "Stage I" or "Stage III" breast cancer. Mrs. Adams' cancer had spread
to 18 of her 27 lymph nodes by the time the cancer was detected. Mrs. Whittington was a
twenty-nine-year-old mother of two who was diagnosed with "Stage IV" breast cancer in 1990.
Id. at 664-665.
In "Stage II," the tumor measures from two to five centimeters and has spread to the lymph
nodes under the arm. In "Stage III," the tumor measures more than five centimeters and involves
auxillary nodes, or lymph nodes near the breast. In "Stage IV," the cancer has metastasized or
spread to other organs of the body. Id. at 664-665. See also NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE,
supra note 7, at 18-19.
44. Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 662.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 663.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 676. The court also noted that the fact that the treatment was being provided in
connection with a research protocol in no way transforms the generally accepted practice into an
"experimental" procedure. Id. at 675.
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Along similar lines, courts have also provided coverage where
HDC-ABMT has sufficiently proven medical value, and where the
procedure is in accordance with generally accepted medical standards.
In Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia,0 the plaintiff was
suffering from Stage IV metastatic breast cancer."1 She received
numerous methods of treatment throughout the course of her cancer
including a mastectomy, six cycles of chemotherapy, and radiation
therapy. Because the cancer continued to spread throughout Pirozzi's
rib cage, her treating physician recommended this thirty-five-year-old
mother of three undergo HDC-ABMT as her "best chance for any
type of meaningful survival." 2
Pre-authorization for the procedure was denied based on an
experimental procedure exclusion. Pirozzi argued that the treatment
is not experimental but is "the medically indicated, state of the art,
generally accepted treatment for her disease."5 3  To resolve this
dispute, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the contract language
and the expert testimony presented at trial.5 4 The court interpreted
the contract language to mean if a treatment has a scientifically proven
value or is in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice then it is not experimental.55
Further, the court relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Beveridge,
in charge of bone marrow transplants at Fairfax County Hospital in
Virginia.56  Dr. Beveridge testified that the treatment was "the
medically necessary and effective treatment for plaintiff given her
condition."' 7 Further, he explained that the treatment is used at most
major medical centers." Based on this testimony and the extensive
50. 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
51. Id. at 588. "Stage IV" refers to cancer that has metastasized. This means it has spread
to other organs of the body. Id. at 588, n.3.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 590. The court found that the insurance contract excluded three types of
treatments: 1) experimental or clinical investigative treatments, 2) treatments of no scientifically
proven value, and 3) treatments not in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 591.
57. Id.
58. Id. The major medical centers cited by Dr. Beveridge as using HDC-ABMT include:
Duke University, Fairfax County Hospital, George Washington University, Georgetown
University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Medical College of Virginia,
Houston's M.D. Anderson Hospital, University of Chicago, University of Michigan,
University of Nebraska, University of Texas-San Antonio, University of Virginia
Medical Center, University of Wisconsin, Yale University Medical School, and all
Florida teaching hospitals.
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evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the treatment has
scientifically proven value and is in accordance with generally accepted
standards of medical practice.59 Thus, the treatment was not experi-
mental. 6
In contrast, other courts have denied coverage based on a finding
that the treatment is not medically necessary. In Fuja v. Benefit Trust
Life Insurance Co.,61 thirty-seven-year-old Grace Rodela Fuja sued
her insurer for denying coverage for HDC-ABMT to treat her breast
cancer. 62  The insurance contract required that the policyholder show
the treatment was "medically necessary" according to five criteria,
including treatment that is "not furnished in connection with medical
or other research. ' 63  Mrs. Fuja failed to meet this burden because
evidence presented at trial indicated the treatment was clearly "in
connection with medical or other research." 64  The court further
indicated that the testimony presented to the trial court established the
"uncertain medical value" of HDC-ABMT.5
Other courts have ruled that HDC-ABMT as a treatment for
breast cancer is experimental under the terms of the insurance policy.
In Harris v. Mutual of Omaha,66 the plaintiffs insurance policy
contained an experimental treatment exclusion.67 The policy provided
that a treatment was experimental if "Reliable Evidence" showed either
that the treatment was the subject of on-going Phase I, II, or III
clinical trials; or under study to determine its maximum tolerated dose,
its toxicity, or its efficacy; or that there was a consensus of opinion
Id.
59. Id. at 594.
60. Id. The court limited its holding requiring coverage to the Plan described in this case
based on the expert testimony presented in this particular trial. Id.
61. 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 1407.
63. Id. at 1408. The contract defined "medically necessary" as treatments that are:
[1] required and appropriate for care of the Sickness or the injury; or that are (2] given
in accordance with generally accepted principles of medical practice in the U.S. at the
time furnished; and that are [3] approved for reimbursement by the Health Care
Financing Administration; and that are (4] not deemed to be experimental, educational
or investigational in nature by any appropriate technological assessment body established
by any state or federal government; and that are [5] not furnished in connection with
medical or other research.
Id. Because the "medically necessary" requirement falls under the "benefits" section as opposed
to the "exclusions" portion of the contract, Mrs. Fuja bore the burden of proving the treatment
was medically necessary. Id.
64. Id. at 1410.
65. Id. at 1412.
66. 992 F. 2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
67. Id. at 708.
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among experts that further studies or clinical trials were necessary to
determine the maximum tolerated dose, toxicity, or efficacy.6"
"Reliable Evidence," according to the policy, was a term of art and was
limited to published reports and articles in authoritative medical and
scientific literature, written protocols used by the treating facility, and
written informed consent used by the treating facility.69
The plaintiff in Harris received the treatment as part of a Phase
II clinical trial, the goal of which was to gather data on response rate,
toxicity and survival rates.7" The court reviewed eighteen articles
which concluded that HDC-ABMT was currently in the developmen-
tal stage and required more clinical research before it could be
considered standard treatment for breast cancer." Based on the
evidence presented, the court found the treatment was experimental
according to the policy's definition and, therefore, not covered.72
Similarly, in Holder v. Prudential Insurance Co.," the court found
that HDC-ABMT was experimental both with regard to the policy
terms and as a matter of law." The plaintiffs insurance policy
specifically excluded from coverage treatment that was not medically
necessary for medical care. 75  For a treatment to be reasonably
necessary, the policy required that it be ordered by a doctor, custom-
arily recognized as appropriate, and not experimental. 76  The lower
court relied on evidence that clinical studies showed that HDC-ABMT
for the treatment of breast cancer was still being investigated at the
time the plaintiff underwent the procedure.7 7 The lower court also
noted that the plaintiff was one of only twenty to thirty women
nationwide to receive the treatment pursuant to the particular protocol
she received. 7' Based on this evidence, the circuit court ruled there
was no error in the lower court's finding that the treatment was
experimental under the policy's terms.79
The plaintiff's argument that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer is
not experimental as a matter of law was also rejected by the court.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 709.
71. Id. The articles were all published between 1986 and 1992.
72. Id. at 713.
73. 951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992).
74. Id. at 90-91.




79. Id. at 91.
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The court went on to distinguish cases where various courts allowed
coverage despite exclusionary provisions."0 This part of the decision
is undermined, however, by the court's statement that "[h]ad [plaintiff]
undergone a similar treatment more recently under an accepted
protocol, this case may have turned out differently.""1 As the court
explained in a footnote: "Several recent studies and the cases in which
they have been applied to compel coverage ... lead to the conclusion
that the treatment, under a different protocol than that administered to
[plaintiff], may no longer be considered experimental. 8 2
2. Determining Coverage on Other Grounds
From a procedural standpoint, some courts have been willing to
grant injunctive relief and treatment coverage when insurers denied
coverage without following the procedures in their own policies. In
Kekis v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utica- Watertown, Inc.,3 Ms.
Kekis suffered from particularly high risk breast cancer.8 4 With
standard chemotherapy, her doctors were not optimistic about her
survival. Ms. Kekis's treating oncologist recommended HDC-ABMT
and Ms. Kekis was able to enroll in a research protocol.8" When the
hospital performing the research sought pre-authorization, it was
denied based on a clause in Ms. Kekis's policy which excluded
experimental or investigative services from coverage.
8 6
In analyzing the evidence presented at trial, the court focused on
the determination of the nature of the procedure, rather than evidence
about the procedure itself. The court found that Blue Cross and Blue
Shield (BC/BS) did not follow the provisions in the policy with regard
to determining experimental or investigative exclusions. 7
The court found that BC/BS applied a dictionary definition of
what is experimental when they denied coverage. 8 Because BC/BS
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 91, n.5 (citing White v. Caterpillar, 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo.), affid, 985
F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn.
1991); Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 661).
83. 815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
84. Id. at 573. She was at high risk because the cancer had spread to seventeen of her
eighteen lymph nodes. Id.
85. Id. at 574.
86. Id. at 575.
87. Id. at 579.
88. Id. The policy itself provided a working definition of what was considered to be
experimental or investigative treatment by BC/BS:
a procedure is experimental/investigative under the policy only if, in the view of
BC/BS, the service or procedure has no proven medical value. If BC/BS determines
[Vol. 20:451
Insurance Coverage
did not follow the definition in its own policy, the court held the
BC/BS reviewer's determination to be arbitrary and capricious.8 9
BC/BS never determined the medical value of HDC-ABMT. In
contrast, Kekis was able to show through expert testimony that HDC-
ABMT has proven medical value. 90 On this evidence, the court
granted the injunction.91
The Kekis court relied on Dosza v. Crum & Forster Insurance
Co.92 in reaching its conclusion.93 Dosza involved HDC-ABMT for
a multiple myeloma patient. The insurer in Dosza denied coverage
based on an experimental procedure exclusion clause.94 The court
held such denial was arbitrary and capricious because the determination
did not conform with the terms set out in the health plan.9" In
essence, the in-surance company ignored the actual language of the plan
and added a new exclusion which denied coverage for investigational
treatment.96 The court granted the injunction.97
Courts have also allowed coverage when the insurer failed to
assess the most recent medical data for determining the experimental
nature of the treatment.9" In White, the plaintiffs treating physician
recommended HDC-ABMT, believing that without the treatment the
plaintiff had no chance of survival. 99 Plan administrators denied
coverage. Because the plan administrators refused to assess the most
recent medical studies regarding the efficiency of ABMT as it
pertained to breast cancer, the court found the decision not to cover the
procedure arbitrary and capricious. The court granted injunctive relief
requiring coverage of the treatment.'00
More frequently, courts have denied treatment because HDC-
ABMT is either expressly or implicitly not covered by the policy. In
that a service or procedure does have proven medical value, then the experimen-
tal/investigative exclusion clause does not provide a legitimate basis for denying
coverage.
Id.
89. Id. at 581.
90. Id. at 584.
91. Id.
92. 716 F. Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989).
93. Kekis, 815 F. Supp. at 581.
94. Dosza, 716 F. Supp. at 134.
95. Id. at 137.
96. Id. at 138.
97. Id. at 140.
98. See, e.g., White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 985 F.2d 564
(8th Cir. 1991).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1424.
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Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan,"0' the court held that HDC-
ABMT was not covered by a health plan which did cover chemothera-
py, but limited coverage of ABMT to specified diseases not including
breast cancer.0 2 The court upheld the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment's decision not to cover the treatment based on the terms of the
plan. Similarly, in Caudill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North
Carolina, 3 a plan which covered HDC-ABMT for only specified
diseases, which did not include breast cancer, was upheld and the
denial of benefits was considered the "only logical interpretation of the
policy."1°4
In addition, the court denied an injunction in Goepel v. Mail
Handlers Benefit Plan"'5 based on the following evidence: the
contract expressly did not cover HDC-ABMT for breast cancer,1"6
the materials and brochure were unambiguous so that plaintiffs had the
opportunity to make an informed choice regarding their insurance,0 7
and the plaintiffs were given adequate notice regarding the change in
plan benefits."'
Finally, the court in Wolf v. Prudential Insurance Co.1" denied
coverage based on a different provision in the contract.1 In Wolf,
the experimental procedure exclusion specifically excluded from
coverage the medical use of a service or supply that is still under study,
and is not recognized as a safe and effective diagnosis or treatment."'
Such treatment included clinical trials."' The HDC-ABMT re-
ceived by Ms. Wolf was administered as part of a clinical trial.1 3
Because the policy expressly excluded procedures administered through
a clinical trial, HDC-ABMT as it was administered to Ms. Wolf was
denied. 14
The decisions in this section demonstrate the ways in which courts
have avoided the real issues of how to determine whether treatment is
experimental and who is the proper party to make the determination.
101. 995 F.2d at 805 (8th Cir. 1993).
102. Id.
103. 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 80.
105. 1993 WL 384498 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993).
106. Id. at *6.
107. Id. at 06-7.
108. Id. at *7-8.
109. 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
110. Id. at 795.
111. Id. at 795-796.
112. Id. at 796.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 799.
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Decisions based on principles of contract interpretation and principles
of informed contracting lend little to the debate addressed in this
Comment. The purpose they serve is to provide the court an avenue
through which it can deny coverage without setting any precedent with
regard to experimental treatment exclusions.
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that an alternative method
of analysis must be employed to ensure that treatment is provided to
those who need it to survive and to ensure that decisions about
insurance coverage are made based on a consistent analysis of factors.
One approach has been to legislate in this area and to require insurance
companies to provide or offer to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer patients. The following sections discuss the similarities
and differences of the legislation passed.
B. Legislative Mandates
Legislatures have responded to the confusing and unhelpful line
of precedents in two ways. One response has been to enact statutes
that mandate health insurers to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT
under certain circumstances.11 This includes certifying and paying
for the treatment. Other states merely require that insurers offer an
option to purchase additional coverage for the treatment, usually at an
additional cost, as part of their general insuring arrangement." 6
While some states have adopted legislative mandates to ensure
that women will get the treatment they need, such mandates are not a
panacea. Legislative mandates only reach a small number of breast
cancer sufferers in limited areas of the nation. " 7 Furthermore, since
some of the legislation only requires that insurance companies offer to
provide coverage under their policies and does not actually compel
coverage,1 18 mandates, while a step in the right direction, are more
of a band-aid than a cure.
1. Mandates to Provide
California,' 9  Minnesota, 120  New Hampshire,1 21  Ken-
115. See infra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 137.148 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 6.
118. See infra notes 137-148 and accompanying text.
119. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985 (West 1995) provides in part as follows:
§ 123985. Bone marrow transplant; reimbursement; conditions
(a) A bone marrow transplant for the treatent of cancer shall be reimbursable
under this article, when all of the following conditions are met:
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tucky,12 2 Massachusetts, 123  and Florida124  have enacted legislation
(1) The bone marrow transplant is recommended by the recipient's attending
physician.
(2) The bone marrow transplant is performed in a hospital that is approved
for participation in the California Children's Services program.
(3) The bone marrow transplant is a reasonable course of treatment and is
approved by the appropriate hospital medical policy committee.
(4) The bone marrow transplant has been deemed appropriate for the recipient
by the program's medical consultant. The medical consultant shall not disapprove the
bone marrow transplant solely on the basis that it is classified as experimental or
investigational.
(b) The program shall provide reimbursement for both donor and recipient surgery.
See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133.8 (West 1995) which provides in part as follows:
§14133.8. Bone marrow transplant; reimbursement; conditions
(a) A bone marrow transplant for the treatment of cancer for beneficiaries, shall be
reimbursable under this chapter, when all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The bone marrow transplant is recommended by the recipient's physician.
(2) The bone marrow transplant is performed in a hospital that is approved
for participation in the Medi-Cal program.
(3) The bone marrow transplant is a reasonable course of treatment and is
approved by the hospital medical policy committee when there is an existing committee
or a committee can be established.
(4) The bone marrow transplant has been deemed appropriate for the recipient
by the program's medical consultant. The medical consultant shall not disapprove the
bone marrow transplant solely on the basis that it is dassified as experimental or
investigational.
(5) Full federal financial participation is available for reimbursement for the
performance of the bone marrow transplant.
(b) The program shall provide reimbursement for both donor and recipient surgery.
120. MINN. STAT. § 62A.309 (1996) provides in part as follows:
62A.309 Breast Cancer Coverage
Subdivision 2. Required Coverage. Every health plan... provide to each covered person
who is a resident of Minnesota coverage for the treatment of breast cancer by high-dose
chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplantation and for expenses arising
from the treatment.
Subdivision 3. Greater Coinsurance or Copayment Prohibited. Coverage under this section
shall not be subject to any greater deductible than that applicable to any other coverage
provided by the health plan.
Subdivision 4. Greater deductible prohibited. Coverage under this section shall not be
subject to any greater deductible than that applicable to any other coverage provided by
the health plan.
121. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419.5-c (1995) provides as follows:
§ 419:5-c Coverage for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplants.
Every hospital service corporation, and every other similar corporation licensed
under the laws of another state, shall provide to each group, or to the portion of each
group comprised of certificate holders of such insurance who are residents of this state
and whose principal place of employment is in this state, coverage for expenses arising
from the treatment of breast cancer by autologous bone marrow transplants according
to protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute.
122. 1996 Ky. Acts 114 provides in part as follows:
Insurance - Health-Coverage for Breast Cancer Treatment
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Section 1. A New Section of Subtitle 17 of KRS Chapter 304 is Created to Read as
Follows:
(1) All insurers issuing individual health insurance policies in this Commonwealth which
provide coverage for treatment of breast cancer by chemotherapy on an expense-incurred
basis shall also provide coverage for treatment of breast cancer by high-dose chemother-
apy with autologous bone marrow transplantation or stem cell transplantation.
(2) The administration of high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow
transplantation or stem cell transplantation shall only be covered when performed in
institutions that comply with the guidelines of the American Society for Blood and
Marrow Transplantation or the International Society of Hematotherapy and Graft
Engineering, whichever has the higher standard.
(3) Treatment of breast cancer by high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone
marrow transplantation or stem cell transplantation shall not be considered experimental
or investigational. Coverage for transplantation under this section shall not be subject
to any greater coinsurance or copayment than that applicable to any other coverage
provided by the health plan.
Sections 2-5 of the Act provide that coverage for HDC-ABMT be provided by: (1) insurers
issuing group or blanket health insurance policies which provide benefits for the treatment of
breast cancer by chemotherapy; (2) nonprofit hospital, medical-surgical, dental and health services
corporations issuing contracts to provide benefits for treatment of breast cancer by chemotherapy;
health maintenance organizations issuing contracts which provide benefits for treatment of breast
cancer with chemotherapy; and (4) health benefit plans which provide for treatment of breast
cancer by chemotherapy. Id.
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47M (1996) provides as follows:
§ 47M. Accident and sickness insurance benefits for bone marrow transplants
Any individual policy or accident and sickness insurance issued pursuant to section
one hundred and eight, and any group blanket policy of accident and sickness insurance
issued pursuant to section one hundred and ten, shall provide coverage for a bone
marrow transplant or transplants for persons who have been diagnosed with breast
cancer that has progressed to metastatic disease; provided, however, that said person
shall meet the criteria established by the department of public health. The department
of public health shall promulgate rules and regulations establishing criteria for eligibility
for coverage hereunder which shall be consistent with medical research protocols
reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute.
See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 4F (1996) (providing similar coverage for those persons
covered under a group health maintenance contract); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 80 (1996)
(providing similar coverage for those covered under any contract between a subscriber and a
corporation under an individual or group hospital service plan); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176B,
§ 40 (1996) (providing similar coverage for those covered under an individual or group medical
service agreement); MAMS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32A, § 17A (1996) (providing similar coverage for any
active or retired employee of the commonwealth who is insured under group insurance coverage).
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236 (West 1996) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(2) An insurer or a health maintenance organization may not exclude coverage for bone
marrow transplant procedures recommended by the referring physician and the treating
physician under a policy exclusion for experimental, clinical investigative, educational,
or similar procedures contained in any individual or group health insurance policy or
health maintenance organization contract issued, amended, delivered, or renewed in this
state that covers treatment for cancer, if the particular use of the bone marrow
transplant procedure is determined to be accepted within the appropriate oncological
specialty and not experimental pursuant to subsection (3).
(3)(a) the Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative Services must adopt rules specifying the
bone marrow transplant procedures that are accepted within the appropriate oncological
specialty and are not experimental for purposes of this section. The rules must be based
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which requires insurers to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer.
The legislation of these states have several similarities and
differences. Similarities among them include the following: Minnesota
and Kentucky provide that the coverage of HDC-ABMT cannot be
subject to greater coinsurance or greater deductible; 121 the New
Hampshire and Minnesota statutes impose a residency require-
ment;126 and California and Florida require that the treatment be
upon recommendations of an advisory panel appointed by the Secretary, composed of:
1. One adult oncologist, selected from a list of three names recommended by the
Florida Medical Association;
2. One pediatric oncologist, selected from a list of three names recommended by
the Florida Pediatric Society;
3. One representative of the J. Hillis Miller Health Center at the University of
Florida;
4. One representative of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute,
Inc.;
5. One consumer representative, selected from a list of three names recommended
by the Insurance Commissioner;
6. One representative of the Health Insurance Association of America;
7. Two representatives of health insurers, one of whom represents the insurer with
the largest Florida health insurance premium volume and one of whom represents the
insurer with the second largest Florida health insurance premium volume; and
8. One representative of the insurer with the largest Florida small group health
insurance premium volume.
(b) The Secretary must appoint a member of the advisory panel to serve as chairperson.
(c) The Office of the Deputy Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services must provide, within existing resources, staff support to enable
the panel to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
(d) In making recommendations and adopting rules under this section, the advisory
panel and the Secretary shall:
1. Take into account findings, studies, or research of the federal Agency for Health
Care Policy, National Cancer Institute, National Academy of Sciences, Health Care
Financing Administration, and Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and
any other relevant information.
2. Consider whether the federal Food and Drug Administration or National
Cancer Institute are conducting or sponsoring assessment procedures to determine the
safety and efficacy of the procedure or substantially similar procedures, or of any part
of such procedures.
3. Consider practices of providers with respect to requesting or requiring patients
to sign a written acknowledgment that a bone marrow transplant procedure is
experimental.
(e) The advisory panel shall conduct, at least biennially, a review of scientific evidence
to ensure that its recommendations are based on current research findings and that
insurance policies offer coverage for the latest medically acceptable bone marrow
transplant procedures.
(4) Any rule adopted under this section applies only to claims filed under policies issued
or renewed after the effective date of the rule.
125. MINN. STAT. § 62A309(3); 1996 Ky. Acts 114 § 1(3).
126. MINN. STAT. § 62A.309(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419.5-c.
Insurance Coverage
recommended by a treating physician.127 On the other hand, Ken-
tucky is the only state that specifically proclaims that HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer is not experimental.12 Kentucky also is alone in only
requiring insurers to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT if the policy
provides coverage for standard chemotherapy for breast cancer.129
The most common and significant thread running through the
legislative mandates to provide, however, is the requirement that the
procedure be an appropriate course of treatment and be reviewed and
approved by an appropriate body. California requires that the
treatment be approved by the appropriate hospital medical policy
committee and deemed appropriate for the recipient by a medical
consultant.13 ° New Hampshire requires coverage for expenses arising
from the treatment of breast cancer by ABMT according to protocols
reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute. 131
The Massachusetts statute takes a somewhat different approach to
mandating coverage. In that state, insurers must provide coverage for
metastatic breast cancer if they meet criteria established by the
Department of Public Health.1 32 The statute goes on to provide that
the Department of Public Health may promulgate rules establishing
criteria for eligibility for coverage consistent with research protocols,
reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute. 133 Under
this statute, an independent agency is charged with establishing criteria
for coverage, but the main requirement is that coverage be consistent
with approved research protocols.
The Florida statute mandating coverage goes one step beyond the
Massachusetts statute. In Florida, an insurer cannot deny coverage for
HDC-ABMT as recommended by a treating physician if the procedure
is "accepted within the appropriate oncological specialty and not
experimental. ' 134  The statute also provides for an advisory panel
made up of oncologists, consumer representatives, and insurance
representatives to make recommendations to the Secretary of Health
and Rehabilitative Services as to which ABMT procedures are accepted
and not experimental, 131 and enumerates a list of factors that should
127. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985(aXi); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(2).
128. 1996 Ky. Acts 114 § 1(3).
129. 1996 Ky. Acts 114 § 1(1).
130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985(aX3)-(4).
131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4 19 .5-c.
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47M.
133. Id.
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(2).
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3Xa).
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be taken into account by the advisory panel in making recommenda-
tions and by the Secretary in making the final determination.136
The Florida statute presents the most appropriate legislative
response to the question of who should decide coverage. The Florida
statute, which offers a broad, versatile, and responsive solution, will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Comment.
2. Mandates to Offer
Five states including Missouri,137  New Jersey,
131 Virginia,13 9
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3)(d).
137. Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1200 (1996) provides in part as follows:
1. Each entity offering individual and group health insurance policies providing
coverage on an expense-incurred basis, individual and group service or indemnity type
contracts issued by a health services corporation, individual and group service contracts
issued by a health maintenance organization, all self-insured group arrangements to the
extent not preempted by federal law and all managed health care delivery entities of any
type or description, that are delivered, issued for delivery, continued or renewed in this
state on or after January 1, 1996, shall offer coverage for the treatment of breast cancer
by dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplant or stem cell
transplants when performed pursuant to nationally accepted peer review protocols
utilized by breast cancer treatment centers experienced in dose-intensive chemothera-
py/autologous none marrow transplants or stem cell transplants. The offer of benefits
under this section shall be in writing and must be accepted in writing by the individual
or group policyholder or contract holder.
2. Such health care service shall not be subject to any greater deductible or Copayment
than any other health care service provided by the policy, a contract or plan, except that
the policy, contract or plan may contain provision imposing a lifetime benefit maximum
of not less than one hundred thousand dollars, for dose-intensive chemothera-
py/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants for breast cancer
treatment.
3. Benefits may be administered for such health care service through a managed care
program of exclusive and/or preferred contractual arrangements with one or more
providers rendering such health care service. These contractual arrangements may
provide that the provider shall hold the patient harmless for the cost of rendering such
healthcare service if it is subsequently found by the entity authorized to resolve disputes
that:
(1) Such care did not qualify under the protocols established for the providing of
care for such health care service;
(2) Such care was not medically appropriate; or
(3) The provider otherwise failed to comply with the utilization management or
other managed care provision agreed to in any contract between the entity and the
provider.
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6k (West 1995) provides as follows:
1. In addition to benefits provided under regulations adopted pursuant to P.L. 1992,
c. 161 (C. 17B:27A-2 et seq.) and P.L. 1992, c. 162 (C. 17:B27A-17 et seq.), a hospital
service corporation shall offer under every group or individual hospital service
corporation contract providing hospital or medical expense benefits delivered, issued,
executed or renewed in this State, or approved for issuance or renewal in this State by
the Commissioner of Insurance, on or after effective date of this act to provide benefits
for the treatment of cancer by dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow
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Georgia, 4 ' and Tennessee"" have responded less forcefully to the
transplants and peripheral blood stem cell transplants when performed by institutions
approved by the National Cancer Institute or pursuant to protocols consistent with the
guidelines of the American Society of Clinical Oncologists. Benefits for such treatment
shall be provided to the same extent as for any other illness under the contract.
The offer required pursuant to this section shall apply to all hospital service
corporation contracts in which the hospital service corporation has reserved the right to
change the premium. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit a hospital
service corporation in adjusting premium amounts, or providing for reasonable
deductibles or copayments, with respect to benefits provided pursuant to this section.
Sections 2-6 of the statute require that medical service corporations, health service corporations,
insurers providing individual policies, and health maintenance organizations provide the same
benefits as required in Section 1. Id.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1995) provides in part as follows:
§ 38.2-3418.1:1 Coverage for bone marrow transplants.
A. Each insurer proposing to issue individual or group accident and sickness
insurance policies providing hospital, medical and surgical, or major medical coverage
on an expense-incurred basis, each corporation providing individual or group accident
and sickness subscription contracts, and each health maintenance organization providing
a healthcare plan for healthcare services shall offer and make available coverage under
such policy, contract or plan delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in this
Commonwealth on and after January 1, 1995, for the treatment of breast cancer by
dose-intensive chernotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell
transplants when performed pursuant to protocols approved by the institutional review
board of any United States medical teaching colleges including, but not limited to,
National Cancer Institute protocols that have been favorably reviewed and utilized by
hematologists or oncologists experienced in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous
bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants.
B. Such coverage shall not be subject to any greater copayment than that
applicable to any other coverage provided by such policies, contracts or plans, and such
coverage shall be subject to the same deductible as that applicable to any other coverage;
however, a deductible for such coverage in an amount different than that applicable to
any other coverage may also be offered and made available.
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-29-3.3 (1996) (GA. CODE ANN. § 56.3004.4 (Harrison Supp.
1996)) provides as follows:
§ 33-29-3.3 Coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer
and Hodgkin's disease.
(a) Every insurer authorized to issue individual accident and sickness insurance
plans, policies, or contracts shall be required to make available, either as a part of or as
an optional endorsement to all such policies providing major medical insurance coverage
which are issued, delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed on or after July 1, 1995,
coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer and Hodgkin's
disease. Such coverage shall be at least as extensive and provide at least the same degree
of coverage as that provided by the respective plan, policy, or contract for the treatment
of other types of physical illnesses. Such an optional endorsement shall also provide that
the coverage required to be made available pursuant to this Code section shall also cover
the spouse and the dependents of the insured if the insured's spouse and dependents are
covered under such benefit plan, policy, or contract.
(b) The optional endorsement required to be made available under subsection (a)
of this Code section shall not contain any exclusions, reductions, or other limitations as
to coverages, deductibles or coinsurance provisions which apply to bone marrow
transplants for the treatment of breast cancer and Hodgkin's disease unless such provi-
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HDC-ABMT crisis than those states issuing mandates to provide, as
described in the previous section. However, these states have
responded, nonetheless, with statutes mandating insurance companies
to at least offer coverage for HDC-ABMT.
Two commonalities run through mandates to offer. First, each
statute contains a provision regarding allowable costs for the offer of
coverage. In Missouri and Tennessee, the offer of coverage cannot be
subject to any greater deductible or copayment than any other service
provided by the policy.142 However, coverage may be offered at an
additional cost under the Tennessee statute. 143  And the Missouri
sions apply generally to similar benefits provided or paid for under the accident ard
sickness insurance benefit plan, policy, or contract.
(c) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit an insurer, nonprofit
corporation, health care plan, health maintenance organization, or other person issuing
any similar individual accident and sickness insurance benefit plan, policy, or contract
from issuing or continuing to issue an individual accident and sickness insurance benefit
plan, policy, or contract which provides benefits greater than the minimum benefits
required to be made available under this Code section or form issuing any such plans,
policies, or contracts which provide benefits which are generally more favorable to the
insured that those required to be made available under this Code section.
(d) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit the inclusion of
coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer and Hodgkin's
disease that differs from the coverage provided in the same insurance plan, policy, or
contract for physical illnesses if the policyholder does not purchase the optional coverage
made available pursuant to this Code section.
(e) The provisions of this Code section shall apply to individual accident and
sickness insurance policies issued by a fraternal benefit society, a nonprofit hospital
service corporation, a nonprofit medical service corporation, a healthcare plan, a health
maintenance organization, or any similar entity.
See also GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-4.4 (Michie 1995) (GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3102.7 (Harrison
Supp. 1996)).
141. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504 (Supp. 1995) provides in part as follows:
§ 56-7-2504 Cancer Treatment.
(a) In the event that coverage for the treatment of cancer by dose-intensive
chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants is provided
for patients or enrollees included in the TennCare program, then each insurer proposing
to issue individual or group accident and sickness insurance policies providing hospital,
medical and surgical, or major medical coverage on an expense-incurred basis, each
corporation providing individual or group accident and sickness subscription contracts,
and each health maintenance organization providing a health care plan for health care
services shall offer and make available such coverage, in the manner provided in
subsection (b), under such policy, contract or plan delivered, issued for delivery or
renewed in this state on and after January 1, 1996.
(b) Such coverage may be offered at an additional cost but such health care service
shall not be subject to any greater deductible than any other health care service under
such policy, contract or plan. Any required copayment shall not exceed the standard
copayment required by the insured's policy, contract or plan for health care service.
142. Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1200(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504(b).
143. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504(b).
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statute allows a provider to impose a lifetime benefit maximum of not
less than $100,000.44 Virginia provides that coverage shall not be
subject to a greater copayment than that applicable to any other
coverage under the policy; however, the statute allows different
deductibles to be offered or made available. 45
On the other hand, the New Jersey statute only applies to health
benefit providers who have reserved the right to change their premium
and further provides that nothing in the provision shall limit the right
of the hospital to adjust the premium or require reasonable deductibles
or copayments.146 Finally, Georgia provides that the offer of cover-
age shall not contain any exclusion, reduction, or other limitations as
to coverages, deductibles, or coinsurance provisions which apply to
bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer.
147
The second commonality is that three of the five states require
that coverage be offered and made available for HDC-ABMT
performed pursuant to nationally accepted, peer-reviewed proto-
cols."' This precondition was similarly required with mandates to
provide.
Mandates to offer are less controversial than mandates to provide.
Mandates to offer are less controversial than mandates to provide.
Under mandates to offer, only those who desire coverage for HDC-
ABMT for breast cancer will opt for coverage and pay the increased
premium. This is desirable in that it prevents the general public from
paying increased premiums for this special treatment. On the other
hand, mandates to offer can be criticized as doing very little to help
women obtain this treatment because most people, when faced with
this option, will choose a lower premium rather than coverage for a
treatment that they probably have never heard of for a disease they
think they will not get.
Still, the question must be posed as to whether legislative
intervention is appropriate at all. The following section explores why
insurance companies use exclusionary provisions. It also discusses the
values and limits of both judicial interpretations and legislative
responses to the provisions.
144. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1200(2).
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1(B).
146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6k(1).
147. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-29-3.3(b).
148. MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1200(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6k(1); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3418.1:1(A).
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III. ANALYSIS OF EXCLUSIONARY TREATMENT PROVISIONS
A trend is emerging to mandate insurers to either offer coverage
or provide coverage. The question then becomes: Should more states
follow suit? Or, should mandates play a role in national health care
reform? To answer these questions, it is necessary first to assess the
policy reasons behind exclusionary clauses and, second, to assess the
rationales and policies asserted both in support of and in opposition to
judicial and legislative intervention.
A. Exclusionary Clauses
Contrary to popular belief, insurance companies did not incorpo-
rate exclusionary treatment provisions in their policies to harass
policyholders or with a malicious intent to deny treatment to those who
need it. "Generally, the plan administrators are not heartless beasts
trying to deprive desperately ill persons of needed medical care. They
are responsible for administering a plan as written, using limited funds
available to them to provide for the medical needs of all members of
the plan." '149 Accordingly, exclusionary clauses serve an economic
function which is indispensable to the existence of the insurance
industry.
One reason insurance policies include exclusionary clauses is cost
containment. Health care costs have risen at a rate that consistently
exceeds that of general economic inflation.'50 Because of this, those
who pay for medical services are searching for new and innovative
ways to contain costs. Exclusionary clauses are one such device. By
excluding these often expensive and innovative treatments, insurance
companies limit their liability to only those treatments that have been
proven to be effective. Such limitations on financial liability are the
primary reason for exclusionary clauses.'
A second reason insurance policies include exclusionary clauses is
because exclusionary clauses assist insurance companies in setting
premium rates. Health insurance was developed to help spread the
149. Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, A Trial Judge's View of Tort Reform, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 853, 858 (1994).
150. James S. Cline & Keith A. Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language in the Containment
of Health Care Cost, 21 TORT INS. L. J. 120, 120 (1985).
151. Barbara A. Fisfis, Comment, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical
Treatment Necessarily Incurred Should Be Excluded from Coverage Under a Health Insurance Policy
Provision Which Excludes From Coverage "Experimental" Medical Treatments?, 31 DuQ. L. REV.
777, 780 (1993); Jennifer Belk, Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health
Insurance Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 812 (1991).
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costs of medical care."5 2 If insurance companies were held liable for
any fly-by-night treatment that arises, it would be impossible to
determine what costs are to be shared or what risks they are taking.
As the court pointed out in Free v. Travelers Insurance Co.:1"3 "The
Court is also mindful of the fact that to require insurers to pay for
every remedy, proven or unproven, prescribed by a physician, could
invalidate the actuarial basis of current premium rates."" Thus, the
effect of excluding experimental treatment "ha[s] the desirable effect of
affording greater protection to the general public, and in particular, [to]
... patients who are especially vulnerable to unfounded claims of
miraculous cures." l55
The third reason insurance policies contain exclusionary clauses
is so that insurance companies only pay for safe and proven effective
treatment. By covering only treatments that are safe and effective,
health benefit providers ensure the best use of scarce healthcare
resources.15 6
On the other hand, if insurance companies did not utilize
exclusionary clauses, they would have problems setting premium rates
because expenditures for experimental or investigative treatments
would be unanticipated at the time rates were set. In addition, even
assuming insurance companies could set premiums at a proper rate
such a rate might be so high that the average person could not afford
to purchase health insurance.
B. Judicial and Legislative Coverage Determinations
A policyholder's first encounter with an experimental treatment
provision will likely be after the insured has sought pre-authorization
for a treatment which the insurer has denied based on the insurer's
conclusion that the treatment is experimental. The policyholder can
challenge the plan administrator's decision to deny coverage through
the courts. Often, a policyholder will seek injunctive relief and ask the
court to enjoin the insurer from denying coverage. Until recently, the
courts were the insureds' best recourse against the insurance company.
152. Belk, supra note 151, at 811. Implicit in the idea of spreading the cost of medical care
is the underlying premise that such costs are ascertainable at the point at which the premium is
set. Id
153. 551 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1982).
154. Cline & Rosten, supra note 150, at 133 (citing Free, 551 F. Supp. at 560).
155. Fisfis, supra note 151, at 781 n.14 (quoting Zuckerbergv. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
108 A.2d 56, 62 (1985)).
156. Audrey A. Hale, National Health Reform Must Include Explicit Criteria for
"Experimental" Treatments, HEALTiiSPAN, Jan. 1994, at 1.
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In the past four years, state legislatures have stepped into the coverage
arena in an attempt to preempt case law and make a final statement
about coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer."5 7
The following is a discussion of merits and limits of both judicial
determinations and legislative intervention. The purpose of this
discussion is to outline various methods of dealing with and perhaps
overcoming experimental treatment provisions generally, using HDC-
ABMT breast cancer treatment as an example.
1. Judicial Intervention
Before legislative mandates were enacted, if an insured was
dissatisfied with a coverage determination made by her insurance
company, her best chance of getting needed treatment was to bring a
lawsuit asking for injunctive relief. Then, it was up to the trial court
judge to listen to evidence presented by both sides about whether the
treatment was experimental and come to his or her own conclusion.
The value of judicial determinations is that each case is decided
on its own facts. However, this is also the biggest drawback. Because
each court makes an independent determination about whether
treatment should or should not be covered based on the policy terms,
the decisionmaking process, and expert testimony about the effective-
ness of the treatment, there is a lot of room for inconsistency in the
verdicts. A judge hearing a case in one jurisdiction may provide
treatment, while a judge in another jurisdiction may deny treatment on
substantially similar facts. In cases where someone's life depends on
the outcome, arbitrary, case-by-case judicial decisionmaking is
inappropriate.
In addition, litigation is time-consuming and costly. Many breast
cancer sufferers do not have the time or resources to withstand a trial.
And, because each case turns on its own facts, it is not likely that
breast cancer patients will be able to rely on precedent to get the
coverage they need at the summary judgment stage before precious
time and resources are expended. The value of precedent is further
limited because, even if a patient can find a case in her favor, there is
also a substantial likelihood that an unfavorable case also exists that is
not in her favor.
157. Legislation regarding experimental treatment provisions for HDC-ABMT has only
been promulgated in the last four years. See supra notes 119-148 and accompanying text. The
earliest legislation was adopted in New Hampshire and was effective January 1993. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 419.5-c (1995).
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A final criticism of judicial determinations is that courts are ill-
equipped to make broad social policy or specific medical determina-
tions. Broad issues of social policy, such as whether a treatment
should be covered by an insurance policy, should be handled by the
legislative branch.' In addition, medical decisions, such as whether
a treatment has become generally accepted practice, should be made
within the medical community.
2. Legislative Mandates
Legislative intervention arose out of the inconsistency of the case
law. Arguments supporting and opposing legislative mandates can be
broken into three categories: (1) Appropriateness of legislative action,
(2) Nature of the relationships between the parties, and (3) Nature of
the procedure.
Regarding the appropriateness of legislative action, the argument
can be made that the legislative branches are not in a position to be
making medical determinations regarding what is an experimental
treatment. Arguably, this task should be deferred to the medical
community. When the legislature makes a decision on an issue such
as whether to cover HDC-ABMT for breast cancer they solicit expert
medical information. However, as with any issue brought before a
court or legislature, a battle of experts is inevitable and he who has the
best expert wins. Life and death decisions, such as whether a last
resort treatment should be covered, should not be left up to a
legislative branch that is susceptible to public pressure. Ultimately, the
success and efficiency of innovative treatments should be determined
by the medical community, not the legislative branch.5 9
On the other hand, one reason legislative intervention is appropri-
ate is inherent in the structure of the government itself. The role of
both state and federal legislatures is to represent the interests of their
constituents. The legislative branches of government are the most
accountable to the citizenry, and thus are in the best position to bring
about social change or to make policy determinations. As pointed out
by the court in Fuja, determining what procedures insurance compa-
nies should cover is the type of problem that must be decided by the
legislature. 6 ° "As a court of law we are empowered to decide legal
issues presented by specific cases or controversies. The greater social
158. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1412.
159. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3Xa) (creating an advisory panel including
members of the medical community).
160. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1412.
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questions must be decided by the political branches of government .
-161 And so the political branches in the states specified above
have spoken and have taken upon themselves an appropriate task of
deciding an issue of social policy.
Another reason legislative intervention is appropriate is that in the
absence of legislative intervention, people are forced to litigate. Even
if they are able to withstand the rigors of a court battle, litigation does
little more than drive up the cost of insurance. Litigation either leads
to more exclusions to contain costs or to premium hikes that render
insurance unaffordable. Either way, this is a lose-lose situation to
which legislative mandates offer a consistent, affordable alternative.
Regarding the nature of the relationships between the parties, it
is arguable that we live in a capitalistic society where goods and
services are exchanged in a free market. Healthcare is a service similar
to other services ruled by the market. As such, the legislature should
take a hands-off approach. The free market should take care of the
relationship between the insurers and insured, and whether particular
treatments will be provided. If there is enough demand, the market
will find a way to supply it.1 62
This argument is not persuasive, however, because of the inherent
inequity in status between the insurer and the insured. For example,
in Goepel, the court made clear that it would not obligate insurers to
cover HDC-ABMT if the insurance policy does not by its terms
provide coverage.163 As a result, healthcare rationing will remain in
the hands of insurers in the absence of legislative mandates. 1" But,
recent cases indicate that there is opportunity for corruption and
manipulation within insuring arrangements.1 65  Because of this
potential, the legislature should step in to regulate the industry and act
as a check on insurers.
Also, mandates to provide may be criticized for causing increased
costs in general healthcare so that healthcare will become too expensive
161. Id.
162. See William C. Cole, Comment, Infertility: A Survey of the Law and Analysis of the
Need for Legislation Mandating Insurance Coverage, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 715, 732 (1990).
163. Goepel, 1993 WVL 384498 at *8.
164. Health Insurance: Coverage for Bone Marrow Transplants--Goepel v. Mail Handlers
Benefit Plan, 19 AM. J. L. & MED. 351, 352 (1993).
165. Insurance Bad Faith, supra note 1, at 84 (plaintiff contendled that coverage denial
"included financial incentives to [doctors] to deny [bone marrow transplant procedures]"); Belk,
supra note 151, at 811 (asserting "health insurance is vulnerable to manipulation"); In the Courts,
supra note 23, at 27 (asserting cancer patients challenge denials by arguing financial motivation




for the average person. Because HDC-ABMT treatment for breast
cancer is so costly, premiums will ultimately reflect the risk insurers
take that an insured will need that treatment. As such, premiums will
increase in proportion to the risk.
This argument is similarly unpersuasive because coverage denials
based on the corporate bottom line are unethical.'66 Many breast
cancer patients consider denials based on experimental or investigative
exclusionary clauses as insincere and a "cruel form of healthcare cost
'containment'." '167 Can the insurance industry put a price tag on a
person's increased chance of survival? Do plan administrators suffer
a conflict of interest because of financial incentives to deny cover-
age?168
Insurance companies are businesses, first and foremost. And as
businesses, insurers seek to maximize profits and minimize costs. If
the decision about whether to pay for an procedure lies with the person
who actually has to pay, the business result would be unreasonable.
But decisionmaking based on maximizing the corporate bottom line
regardless of the social costs undermines a fundamental principle of
insurance-spreading the risk of costly medical treatment among many
so that the few who need treatment can obtain it.
Finally, it can be argued that state legislatures should not be
allowed to step in and intervene in a private contractual relationship
between the insurer and beneficiary and in the doctor-patient relation-
ship. Private individuals are free to shop around and purchase an
insuring arrangement that provides various kinds of coverage. One
could find an insuring arrangement that covers HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer if one is willing to pay the price. When a private person
enters into an insurance contract that expressly excludes HDC-ABMT
as experimental and whose premium reflects that exclusion, that person
is entitled to no more than what was bargained for. The fact that the
legislature can mandate coverage of such treatment, regardless of a
provision expressly excluding the treatment, seems repugnant to core
principles of contract law. In such a situation, the insured is getting
more than what was bargained for.
Again, this argument is undermined because in the absence of
legislation, the patients in need of treatment cannot fight the insurance
company because of the differences in their status. In a one-on-one
situation, the insurance company will have lawyers and an abundance
166. In the Courts, supra note 23, at 27.
167. Insurance, supra note 23, at 21.
168. See generally id.
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of resources to support their decision to deny coverage. An individual
patient typically cannot afford to litigate, both in terms of time and
money. Moreover, patients are financially, physically, and emotionally
strapped, unable to withstand a lengthy trial. Under these circum-
stances, the chances of winning in court and getting the treatment a
patient needs fast enough to be strong enough to withstand the
treatment are slim.
Regarding the nature of the procedure, an additional reason to
support legislative mandates as they pertain to HDC-ABMT as a
treatment for breast cancer is the medical evidence that the treatment
is no longer experimental. Statistics indicate that the use of HDC-
ABMT is widespread and has some proven success.169
Expert testimony in Pirozzi indicates that while standard
chemotherapy typically produces a 50% tumor response rate, HDC-
ABMT data reveals a much higher response rate of 85%-90%.
170
The testimony also revealed studies indicating survival rates better than
the twelve months survival associated with standard chemotherapy.
171
A Johns Hopkins University study showed a 67% survival at seventeen
months and a University of Chicago study demonstrates a median
survival rate of twenty months and 20% survival rate at three
years.172 Similarly, a 1989 study at Duke resulted in a survival rate
of 80%, as only five out of fifty-four patients suffered a relapse as of
May 13, 1990.173 At least one study on HDC-ABMT indicates the
treatment has a 50-60% short-term favorable response rate to cancer
generally and a 20-25% response rate regarding recurrent breast
cancer. 174
Further data regarding survival rates and efficacy of HDC-ABMT
is set out in a number of other cases. The expert testimony in
Kulakowski v. Rochester Hospital Service Corp.17' indicates that
standard chemotherapy would produce only a 30-60% chance of
remission, whereas HDC-ABMT would yield a 70-90% chance. 17
6
The testimony also revealed that risk of death related to toxicity from
HDC-ABMT has been reduced from 20% to 3-5%.177 The evidence
169. See generally Pongrance, supra note 21, at 336; see infra notes 170-183 and
accompanying text.




174. Insurance Bad Faith, supra note 1, at 84.
175. 779 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
176. Id. at 714; see also Pongrance, supra note 21, at 336.
177. Kulakowski, 779 F. Supp. at 714.
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presented in Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc. 78 indicates a
complete response rate of 10-20% from standard chemotherapy and a
59% response rate from HDC-ABMT. 79 Moreover, two years after
treatment there were no disease free patients who were treated with
standard chemotherapy while HDC-ABMT yielded 20-30% disease
free patients. 80 Finally, in Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Maryland, Inc., t ' an expert from the Dana Farber Cancer Institute
at Harvard and M.D. Anderson Institute in Houston indicated a 70%
total remission rate in candidates who were treated with HDC-ABMT
for Stage IV metastatic breast cancer.'82 Only 15-20% achieved
remission through standard chemotherapy treatments.'8
Finally, evidence that HDC-ABMT is being used at most major
medical institutions supports a finding that the treatment is no longer
experimental.' 84
3. Conclusion: Legislative Mandates Are Necessary
But Not Enough
The foregoing analysis helps to answer the question of who should
decide coverage as between the insured, the insurer, the court or the
legislature. Judicial determinations are inappropriate because they lead
to inconsistency in the case law and ad hoc decisionmaking. Further,
such decisions should be made by the legislative branch, which is
charged with making social policy. Legislative intervention protects
the insured from overreaching by the powerful insurance industry and
reduces the potential for costly and time consuming litigation. For
these reasons, legislative intervention is necessary. But, though
mandates are a positive step toward providing coverage for HDC-
ABMT, mandates can still be criticized for being narrowly tailored and
short sighted.
One criticism of the narrow focus of legislative mandates is that
they do little to tackle the broader policy question of how determina-
tions should be made regarding what treatments are and are not
experimental.' Breast cancer is only one disease and HDC-ABMT
is only one controversial treatment. While legislative mandates to
178. 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991).
179. Id. at 730.; see also Pongrance, supra note 21, at 336.
180. Bucci, 764 F. Supp. at 730.
181. 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991).
182. Id. at 673-674; see also Pongrance, supra note 21, at 336.
183. Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 673.
184. Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 591. See also supra note 58.
185. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236.
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provide have secured treatment for breast cancer sufferers in six states,
there are still many other diseases and controversial treatments about
which this exact same debate still rages. In reality, these mandates are
only helping a few women in a very limited area of the country.
This leads to a second criticism of mandates: they only apply to
women who are fortunate enough to live in the states who have already
passed legislation. Hundreds of thousands of other women who suffer
from breast cancer need this treatment and are unable to obtain it due
to lack of insurance coverage. Consequently, it does not seem fair that
some women will be given a chance to live while others must die
simply because of their state of residence.
A third criticism of legislative mandates is that they do not ensure
women will obtain HDC-ABMT. Instead, legislative mandates only
tell insurance companies what they can and cannot include in their
policies. For example, in Minnesota, one breast cancer sufferer had to
fight what appeared to be an effort by her insurance company to
circumvent the Minnesota statute's mandate to provide coverage.
186
Shirley Murray enrolled in a National Cancer Institute study supported
by her insurer in which half the women participants were randomly
selected to receive HDC-ABMT and the other half received traditional
treatment consisting of radiation and chemotherapy.'87 Murray was
selected to be part of the traditional treatment control group.'
About the time she began chemotherapy, her insurer began
sending her waiver notices. One waiver included a provision that
stated that if she was assigned to traditional treatment and that
treatment failed, the insurer would not cover or provide financial
support for HDC-ABMT. Another letter explained that the insurer
required the return of the signed waiver before it would notify the
bone marrow center that it would support her participation in the
clinical trial. Murray interpreted this letter to mean that her insurer
would not even pay for traditional treatment unless she signed the
waiver giving up her rights to HDC-ABMT. 8 9
Murray refused to sign the waiver and hired an attorney to fight
her insurer. After repeated phone calls and suggestions to sign the
186. Doug Grow, Woman had to fight to get treatment: Breast cancer patient faced Catch-22







waiver, her insurer finally assured her that she did not have to sign the
waiver.19
0
What was Murray's reaction to all of this? She does not think
that women with breast cancer should have to turn to attorneys or
reporters to get the treatment they need.19' So, even in the face of
a mandate to provide, breast cancer sufferers must still overcome
obstacles placed in their path by their insurers who, if the Minnesota
insurer is any indication, are trying desperately to find loopholes in the
legislation requiring coverage.
Mandates are necessary in a nation where authorization for needed
treatment is being denied based on inconsistent policy terms and
judicial decisions. In the six states in which they exist, mandates to
provide absolutely serve the purpose of getting lifesaving treatment to
the people who need it. The criticisms outlined in this Comment are
intended to support the proposition that more action is needed because
only a limited group of women are helped for only one specific
treatment for only one type of cancer. The use of experimental
procedure exclusions to deny coverage is too pervasive to look to
disease by disease, treatment by treatment legislation as the solution.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND MODEL LEGISLATION
A. Alternative Approaches
Judicial determinations are the least effective method of determin-
ing coverage. Not only are courts ill-equipped to make medical
determinations, they are the wrong forum in which social policy should
be made. In contrast, legislative mandates seem to be a trend in
healthcare coverage and, as previously discussed, they are a positive
step toward securing treatment for women with breast cancer.
However, as mentioned above, the existing legislation has many limits.
Therefore, alternative approaches to experimental treatment provisions
are explored below.
One alternative to legislative mandates or case-by-case judicial
determinations would be to impose cost sharing for experimental or
investigative treatments. Under a cost sharing plan, a health benefit
provider would agree to pay a certain percentage of the cost of
treatment. Another alternative would be to charge higher premiums
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amount such as $200,000. This allows the health benefit provider to
assess the nature of the risk and set reasonable premiums.
A third alternative, suggested in Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life
Insurance,19 2 was that a regional cooperative of committees comprised
of "oncologists, internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical
school administrators, economists, representatives of the insurance
industry, patient advocates and politicians" be established.1 93 This
task force would be responsible for defining experimental procedures
and determining what procedures would be cost prohibitive. 94 In
Fuja, the court acknowledged that such an approach would not be a
panacea to rising healthcare costs but it would be one way to address
the problem of contradictory expert testimony that occurs frequently
in cases regarding exclusionary clauses.1 9
An additional alternative is legislation that defines circumstances
under which a health benefit provider may exclude coverage for an
experimental treatment. One drawback to legislative mandates is that
they seem to present a band-aid, not a final cure. In other words, the
case law is controversial, inconsistent, and confusing regarding many
different kinds of treatments for many different kinds of diseases, not
just HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. Admittedly, the rationale
supporting legislative mandates seems to entitle HDC-ABMT
treatment cases to legislative attention. But it is easy to imagine a
scenario where all patients afflicted with a certain disease mobilize and
present their issue to the legislature. The legislative branch then
becomes inundated with making medical decisions on a disease by
disease basis. This is not a role for the legislative branch. However,
if the legislature were to define what kinds of treatment are experimen-
tal, then such a definition could apply across the board no matter what
the disease or treatment.
Florida has enacted legislation which incorporates the third and
fourth alternatives presented above. This Comment proposes that the
Florida legislation serve as model legislation for experimental treatment
provisions. As such, it is discussed in detail in the section that follows.
B. Model Legislation
The Florida statute regarding HDC-ABMT provides the most
appropriate answer to the question of who should decide coverage
192. 18 F.3d 1405.





when an experimental treatment provision is involved. The statute
requires that the Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative Services adopt
rules specifying the bone marrow transplant procedures that are
accepted within the appropriate oncological specialty and are not
experimental.'96 The rules must be based on the recommendations
of an advisory panel appointed by the Secretary and composed of one
adult and one pediatric oncologist, two representatives of major Health
Centers in Florida, one consumer representative, one representative of
the Health Insurance Association, and three representatives of health
insurers. '97
An advisory panel so composed will be better equipped to make
coverage determinations than individual judges or state legislatures.
Because the panel members have a stake in the outcome, the advisory
panel ensures that the perspectives of all interested parties are
represented and debated. The presence of doctors ensures that the
efficacy and general acceptance of the procedure is represented. The
presence of insurance representatives ensures that recommendations are
not so cost prohibitive as to bankrupt insurance companies. And, the
presence of a consumer representative ensures that the individual's
needs are considered when making coverage determinations.
The Florida statute goes beyond merely setting up a panel to
make coverage recommendations. The statute also lists factors which
the advisory panel and the Secretary shall take into account in making
recommendations and adopting rules. 9 ' Factors include the follow-
ing: findings, studies, or research; whether the Federal Drug Adminis-
tration or National Cancer Institute are conducting or sponsoring
assessment procedures to determine the safety and efficacy of the
procedure; and practices of providers with respect to requesting or
requiring patients to sign a written acknowledgment that a bone
marrow transplant procedure is experimental.'99 In addition, the
panel is charged with conducting biannual reviews of scientific evidence
to ensure that its recommendations are based on current research
findings and that insurance policies offer coverage for the latest
medically acceptable bone marrow transplant procedure."
While the Florida statute has been hailed in this Comment as a
"model" that should be followed in other states, it can be criticized as
still being too narrowly focused. The statute does establish an advisory
196. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3Xa).
197. Id.
198. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3Xd).
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236(3Xe).
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panel and a list of considerations, but the statute itself is aimed only
at determining which bone marrow transplant procedures are experi-
mental. This Comment still recommends that a statute based on the
one enacted in Florida be enacted with regard to experimental
treatments generally.
The advisory panel in such a situation would consist of doctors in
various medical specialties, consumer representatives and representa-
tives of the insurance industry. The Secretary and the panel would
consider the factors enumerated in the Florida statute when making
recommendations and promulgating rules. The Legislature may want
to borrow from case law in establishing criteria upon which to base a
determination as to whether a particular treatment is experimental or
not.
Courts have considered many different factors including the cost
of the treatment, the conclusions of expert witnesses, the fact that the
treatment is a last resort and there is a lack of alternative treatments,
duration of use, government approval, research protocols, medical
literature, safety and efficacy, and common use in treating the illness
it is being used for.2"' These criteria should be incorporated into
legislation as factors to be considered in determining whether a
treatment is experimental or not.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, legislative intervention in breast cancer treatment,
and experimental treatments in general, is a trend in this country.
Eleven states require health benefit providers to either offer or provide
HDC-ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer. While such
mandates increase the risk to health benefit providers and the cost to
beneficiaries, the mandates are a positive step toward getting breast
cancer patients the treatment they need.
Legislative mandates to offer are less controversial than mandates
to provide because the former merely requires insurers to offer
beneficiaries the option of paying a higher premium in order to be
covered for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. Those who want coverage
can pay for it. The downside to this approach is that most people will
opt for a lower premium because they lack the psychic ability to know
they may need breast cancer coverage someday. Played out to its
logical conclusion, a beneficiary could face a list of thousands of
options they may choose to be covered for, but will be unwilling to
201. See generally Pongrace, supra note 21.
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select the ones they will need and unable to pay for coverage for
everything on the list.
Mandates to provide eliminate the problem of leaving the option
to the beneficiary regarding whether to opt for coverage. Such
mandates also spread the cost of coverage over all beneficiaries enrolled
in a specific plan, as insurance is intended to do. Still, mandates to
provide do not address the real problem of experimental exclusion
provisions. Such clauses are applicable to many different diseases and
treatments. Requiring insurers to cover HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer does nothing to further our understanding of the propriety of
exclusionary clauses or the standards by which a treatment is to be
judged. To address this, state legislatures should step in and define
how and when a treatment can be excluded from coverage under an
exclusionary clause. Such legislation would apply across the board to
all diseases and treatments, decrease litigation, and provide consistency
in coverage decisions.
